Karsten Wenzlaff, Advisor
August 26th, 2025
October 20, 2026 | NCFA Story Intelligence | Capital Markets And Funding, Leadership And Governance, Artificial Intelligence And Data

On October 16, 2026, You Can See Everything opened in Canadian theatres. Four days later, the documentary about Elizabeth Holmes is still one of the biggest stories at the North American box office. It opened with about US$15 million from only 855 screens. That's an extraordinary result for a documentary about a founder whose company collapsed years ago and is now serving a federal prison sentence.1
Holmes didn't raise money because investors wanted to lose it. She sold a future that sounded possible, surrounded herself with people whose reputations made belief easier, and built a company whose story moved faster than outsiders could verify the technology. By the time the evidence caught up, investors had committed hundreds of millions of dollars.
What follows is a story of how founder trust becomes part of an investment case and how evidence can lose ground to momentum. The same human problem returns whenever investors finance an uncertain future.
The idea is bigger than the product. Theranos tells investors that its technology can run a broad range of tests from tiny amounts of blood. The company is private, the technology is closely guarded and outsiders have limited access to what happens inside the machines. That secrecy can sound like competitive protection when the founder is believed.
Conviction becomes part of the product. Holmes presents Theranos as a mission driven company that can transform healthcare. Investors hear a founder who appears certain about the future and willing to devote herself to it. That confidence is valuable in a startup because the product, market and operating model are all unfinished. It also makes the founder unusually important to the investment case.
The board looks formidable. Fortune described Theranos in 2014 as having one of the most illustrious boards in American business. George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, William Perry, Sam Nunn, James Mattis and other prominent figures gave Holmes access to experience, networks and public credibility that most young founders could never assemble.4
The board can't substitute for technical oversight. A famous director can open doors and challenge strategy. That doesn't automatically give a board the scientific depth to test a diagnostic platform. Prestige can make a young company look safer while leaving the hardest operating question untouched.
The numbers make the story feel real. A multibillion dollar valuation, hundreds of millions raised and national retail partnerships give investors familiar business signals. Those signals usually matter. They become dangerous when investors start treating them as evidence about the one thing the company still has to prove.
The media helps close the loop. Holmes becomes a symbol of Silicon Valley ambition. WIRED has now revisited its own 2014 coverage and acknowledged how media enthusiasm helped amplify the founder story before the science received enough scrutiny.7 The founder earns attention because investors believe. Investors see attention and find another reason to believe.
Good diligence can still ask the wrong question. Investors may spend weeks testing market size, legal structure, partnerships and founder references while the core product remains difficult to inspect. A deal room can contain thousands of pages and still miss the fact that matters most.
The founder can become the gateway to the evidence. That creates a dangerous loop. Investors trust the founder enough to accept the materials, then use those materials to decide whether they should trust the founder. Independent verification has to break that loop.
The criminal case narrows the facts. In January 2022, a federal jury convicts Holmes of conspiracy to defraud investors and three counts of wire fraud tied to transfers totalling more than US$140 million. The jury acquits her on patient related conspiracy and several patient fraud counts, while other investor counts end without a unanimous verdict.10
The sentence makes the cost tangible. In November 2022, Holmes receives 135 months in federal prison. She begins serving the sentence in 2023. The SEC had put the investor principle plainly years earlier when it said investors are entitled to “complete truth and candor” from companies and executives.11
The audience knows how the story ends. That makes the continuing fascination more revealing. People aren't buying tickets because the verdict is unknown. They are watching because confidence, ambition, deception and failure are still compelling human material.
Persuasion still moves money. Canadian investors see the same mechanism in a different setting. How AI Is Changing Canadian Investors’ Decisions found that 84% of surveyed self directed investors used AI, financial creators or both. Technology changes the channel. It doesn't remove the human desire to find someone or something that makes uncertainty feel easier.
Founder conviction still has value. Early stage investors are paid to finance businesses before every answer exists. A founder who can't make others believe in an uncertain future may never recruit the team, customers or capital needed to build it.
Conviction needs independent evidence beside it. Customer calls, production data, technical review, board oversight and financial reconciliation give investors something that doesn't depend on the founder's version of events. The earlier the company, the more important it becomes to know which assumptions are still beliefs.
Holmes is in prison, Theranos is gone and investors now know how the story ended. That makes the mistakes look obvious in hindsight. They were much harder to see when the company was raising money, signing national partners, attracting famous directors and appearing on magazine covers.
The next founder who lets belief outrun the evidence will probably look nothing like Holmes. The company may be building AI, financial infrastructure, robotics, biotech or something investors have not learned how to value yet. The founder may have respected backers, impressive customers and a demonstration that makes the future feel close enough to touch.
Early founders often have to sell conviction before the product, revenue or market fully exists. That's part of building a venture, not evidence of deception. Investors are financing a future that has not happened yet, so imagination belongs in the deal.
The line gets crossed when aspiration is presented as fact, a controlled demonstration is presented as independent proof, or hoped for traction is sold as something already verified. A founder can sell why the future might happen. The investor still has to know what is already true.
STORY INTELLIGENCE
How OpenAI And Anthropic Reached Public Markets
OpenAI and Anthropic show what happens when founder vision, strategic backers, governance choices and enormous private capital converge before public market scrutiny arrives.
FOUNDER BUILD
Inside a Licensed Profession: What Ownright’s Build Teaches Fintech Founders
Ownright offers a current founder case where credibility comes from operating evidence, regulatory fit, customer execution and a system that has processed more than $2 billion of transactions.
MARKET ACTIVITY
FNZ Turnaround Tests La Caisse and Canadian Pension Capital
Repeated capital raises and management changes at FNZ show what investor conviction looks like after the cheque is written, when ownership starts turning into active governance.
NCFA INSIGHT
Canada’s Early Stage Startup Funding Funnel Narrows
A tighter Canadian funding market raises the stakes for founders trying to earn attention and for investors deciding which stories deserve scarce early stage capital.
The National Crowdfunding & Fintech Association (NCFA Canada) is a financial innovation ecosystem that provides education, market intelligence, industry stewardship, networking and funding opportunities and services to thousands of community members and works closely with industry, government, partners and affiliates to create a vibrant and innovative fintech and funding industry in Canada. Decentralized and distributed, NCFA is engaged with global stakeholders and helps incubate projects and investment in fintech, alternative finance, crowdfunding, peer-to-peer finance, payments, digital assets and tokens, artificial intelligence, blockchain, cryptocurrency, regtech, and insurtech sectors. Join Canada's Fintech & Funding Community today FREE! Or become a contributing member and get perks. For more information, please visit: www.ncfacanada.org
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October 14, 2026 | Market Activity | Cybersecurity and Fraud, Digital Identity and Trust, Payments Infrastructure

On October 14, 2026, EnStream launched the Cross-Sector Anti-Fraud Exchange (CSAFE) with major Canadian banks and telecom providers, creating a shared platform for identifying repeat fraud across institutions. Members contribute confirmed fraud information that other participants can use during account opening, authentication and transactions. The exchange gives financial institutions a wider view of known fraud activity, with the potential to stop repeat attempts before customers lose money.
Bell, BMO, CIBC, Desjardins, National Bank, RBC, Rogers, Scotiabank and TELUS are the nine founding participants. EnStream, owned by Bell Mobility, Rogers Communications and TELUS Communications, operates the exchange. CSAFE is available now following an earlier pilot involving CIBC and Rogers, and its organizers are inviting additional organizations to participate.
Criminals often target several organizations, taking advantage of the fact that one provider may have little visibility into fraud detected by another. A bank sees account activity and money movement, while a telecom provider has a different view of mobile devices and communications networks. CSAFE connects cross-sector intelligence so participating institutions can identify repeat fraud using information already confirmed elsewhere.
Members contribute confirmed fraud records to EnStream, which combines, standardizes and enriches the information through its platform. It also assesses whether records remain relevant as circumstances change. Each institution uses the resulting intelligence within its own fraud controls, allowing members to strengthen decisions without replacing their existing systems.
A provider may already have effective tools for detecting suspicious account activity but still miss fraud previously identified by another institution. National Bank's Sardine fraud controls is an example of the investment Canadian banks are making in their own detection systems. CSAFE adds a separate source of intelligence that could help participating institutions make those systems more effective.
The CIBC and Rogers pilot provided the foundation for expanding the exchange to other institutions. EnStream describes the pilot as demonstrating the value of sharing confirmed fraud intelligence between sectors. CSAFE's launch is an infrastructure milestone, with its wider financial impact depending on adoption and operating results.
Canada has a substantial fraud problem. The Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre recorded approximately C$351 million in reported losses during the first six months of 2026. Investment fraud accounted for C$139.6 million, followed by significant losses involving phishing and impersonation. The centre estimates that only 5% to 10% of fraud is reported, leaving much of the problem outside official loss figures.
CSAFE begins with large financial institutions and telecom providers, but EnStream explicitly welcomes additional organizations from finance, technology and other industries. That opens a potential route for fintechs, payment service providers, digital wallets, credit unions and identity technology companies to participate. Membership requirements, pricing and technical access arrangements will determine how practical that opportunity becomes for smaller providers.
For fintech operators, access could improve fraud prevention at several important points in the customer relationship.
Access also has competitive implications. Large banks can invest heavily in fraud analytics and draw on extensive customer activity, while smaller fintechs often work with fewer transactions and more limited internal fraud histories. Shared intelligence could help narrow that gap and allow independent providers to compete more effectively on customer experience, pricing and service. The terms of access will determine whether those benefits extend throughout Canada's financial technology market.
There are opportunities for technology suppliers as well. Fraud analytics providers, identity specialists and systems integration firms could help participants incorporate shared intelligence into existing operations.
As more institutions join CSAFE, the accuracy of shared fraud records becomes increasingly valuable. EnStream says the exchange operates under a defined governance framework, while each participant remains responsible for its own fraud decisions. Clear rules for accessing, updating and correcting records will help protect legitimate customers from mistaken account restrictions and payment interruptions.
For banks and fintechs, reliable intelligence could reduce fraud losses and investigation costs while making digital services safer for customers. The wider opportunity is to strengthen fraud prevention across Canada's financial system without adding unnecessary friction to everyday banking and payments.
CSAFE creates a common source of confirmed fraud intelligence for Canada's largest banks and telecom providers, with opportunities for additional organizations to participate. As more financial services operate across banking, payments and communications networks, shared fraud protection could become increasingly valuable infrastructure. Will Canadian fintechs gain practical access to CSAFE on competitive terms, allowing the entire financial sector to benefit from stronger fraud prevention?
The National Crowdfunding & Fintech Association (NCFA Canada) is a financial innovation ecosystem that provides education, market intelligence, industry stewardship, networking and funding opportunities and services to thousands of community members and works closely with industry, government, partners and affiliates to create a vibrant and innovative fintech and funding industry in Canada. Decentralized and distributed, NCFA is engaged with global stakeholders and helps incubate projects and investment in fintech, alternative finance, crowdfunding, peer-to-peer finance, payments, digital assets and tokens, artificial intelligence, blockchain, cryptocurrency, regtech, and insurtech sectors. Join Canada's Fintech & Funding Community today FREE! Or become a contributing member and get perks. For more information, please visit: www.ncfacanada.org
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October 8, 2026 | NCFA Insight | Artificial Intelligence And Data, Risk Compliance And Regtech, Cybersecurity And Fraud

On October 8, 2026, the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions warned that a small number of companies now dominate frontier AI models and the cloud infrastructure used by Canadian financial institutions, raising the risk of shared technology failures across the financial system. If one critical provider suffers an outage, cyber incident or operating failure, several financial institutions could be affected at the same time. OSFI also says institutions may struggle to maintain a clear view of AI use, vulnerabilities and controls at critical technology providers as adoption expands.
Canadian financial firms are advancing on AI swiftly. The Bank of Canada's 2026 Financial System Survey found that nearly all 54 respondents use AI, with planned expansion into investment management, financial crime prevention, customer service and operating workflows. Respondents themselves raised concentration among a small number of AI and cloud providers and the risk of shared mistakes when firms use similar models. OSFI now says it will assess common dependencies on critical service providers and their effects across the financial system. Canada can supervise how individual firms manage vendors, but it also needs to know when several institutions ultimately depend on the same model, cloud, API or software supplier.
OSFI hasn't introduced new AI rules. Its April frontier AI bulletin already warned that advanced models can find and chain software vulnerabilities at machine speed. Its July guidance on generative and agentic AI went further, including controls around agent identity, permissions, approvals and auditability. Those risks become more consequential as financial AI agents gain more authority inside regulated systems. The October update raises these concerns inside OSFI's formal risk outlook and puts more weight on what happens when the same suppliers support multiple institutions.
| Issue | Already known | What changed October 8 | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|---|
| AI cyber capability | OSFI had already warned that frontier models can speed up vulnerability discovery and attacks. | Frontier AI now receives focused treatment in OSFI's formal risk outlook. | AI moves closer to regular prudential supervision rather than remaining a specialist technology issue. |
| Shared providers | Existing guidance already covered third party concentration and AI dependencies. | Directly links concentrated frontier model and cloud providers with disruptions that can affect several institutions. | A supplier failure can become a financial system problem rather than stay inside one firm. |
| Foreign technology dependence | Third party and operating risk rules already covered outside technology providers. | OSFI now highlights growing dependence on technology services outside Canada. | Foreign policy, technology restrictions or geopolitical events can affect access to services Canadian firms rely on. |
| Common financial system exposure | The Bank of Canada and international regulators had already raised concentration concerns. | OSFI says it will assess common dependencies on critical service providers and their wider effects. | Regulators need to understand connections across firms, not only risk inside each institution. |
| AI adoption | Financial institutions were already expanding AI use. | Warns that moving too slowly can also weaken competitiveness and resilience. | Risk management cannot simply mean slowing AI deployment. |
OSFI is asking institutions to go faster and become more careful at the same time. Frontier AI can improve productivity, cyber defence and vulnerability detection, but governance, testing and controls have to keep pace. The Bank of Canada survey shows how quickly that tension is becoming operational. Nearly all respondents already use AI, 58% report difficulty integrating it into existing infrastructure and workflows, 56% cite talent constraints, and many expect to expand use over the next two years.
A bank may know which technology company it hired without seeing every dependency underneath that supplier. A fintech might use software that calls another company's model through an API while both services ultimately run on the same cloud infrastructure. Two vendors that look separate on a procurement list can still fail together. OSFI's July guidance reflects that problem by telling institutions to map internal and external AI dependencies, test failure scenarios, assess whether AI services can be moved or replaced and require suppliers to disclose whether they use AI to deliver services.
No public Canadian source currently shows which frontier models, cloud providers, APIs and supporting services are shared across regulated financial firms. That doesn't mean OSFI or the institutions have no visibility. It means the public evidence doesn't show a complete view across the system, while OSFI itself says firms may find it difficult to understand AI use and controls at critical third parties. The Financial Stability Board reached a similar conclusion internationally. Its AI monitoring framework focuses specifically on third party dependencies, provider concentration and the data gaps that make those risks harder to track.
The Bank of England's July Financial Stability Report says frontier AI could increase the risk of several firms or technology suppliers being disrupted at once and is being incorporated into financial sector cyber and operating tests. Its scenarios consider simultaneous disruption across firms, common technology supply chains and whether suppliers could support all affected clients at the same time. Canada has identified many of the same risks, but OSFI's October update shows that mapping and assessing common dependencies is still part of the work ahead.
Financial institutions need better ways to see which models, clouds, APIs, datasets and agents support critical workflows, where suppliers overlap and whether a service can actually be replaced during an outage. They will also need clear records showing which AI system acted, what access it had, which data it used and who approved important actions. AI agents inside payment flows already make identity, permissions, approval limits and audit trails practical operating requirements rather than abstract governance concerns.
The commercial regtech opportunity is beyond generic AI compliance software. Banks, insurers and fintechs may need live dependency maps, supplier overlap monitoring, model switching tools, agent access controls, failure testing and records that can be reviewed by boards and regulators. The recent Agentic Regulator projects show builders already working on agent identity, auditability, market monitoring and automated supervisory tools. Smaller institutions may need these tools most because they depend more heavily on outside AI providers and have less capacity to build comparable controls themselves.
Simply adding more vendors won't solve the problem if those vendors rely on the same models or cloud infrastructure underneath. Better visibility, tested alternatives and clear permission controls may be more important than the number of contracts an institution signs. As AI moves closer to financial decisions, companies that can safely connect data, models and automated actions will gain an operating advantage. The tools that make those connections visible and controllable may become just as important as the models themselves.
OSFI's October warning is really about the infrastructure underneath financial AI. Canadian institutions are adopting more capable models while relying on a technology supply chain that is concentrated, layered and often outside Canada. The next supervisory challenge is knowing when many firms depend on the same underlying technology before an outage, cyber attack or model failure reveals the connection. That also creates a clear opening for Canadian fintech and RegTech companies that can map AI dependencies, test alternatives, control autonomous agents and produce reliable records of what those systems do.
The National Crowdfunding & Fintech Association (NCFA Canada) is a financial innovation ecosystem that provides education, market intelligence, industry stewardship, networking and funding opportunities and services to thousands of community members and works closely with industry, government, partners and affiliates to create a vibrant and innovative fintech and funding industry in Canada. Decentralized and distributed, NCFA is engaged with global stakeholders and helps incubate projects and investment in fintech, alternative finance, crowdfunding, peer-to-peer finance, payments, digital assets and tokens, artificial intelligence, blockchain, cryptocurrency, regtech, and insurtech sectors. Join Canada's Fintech & Funding Community today FREE! Or become a contributing member and get perks. For more information, please visit: www.ncfacanada.org
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October 6, 2026 | Regulation And Policy, Banking And Credit, Financial Crime And Compliance, Cybersecurity And Operational Resilience, Digital Assets Blockchain And Tokenization, Payments And Money Movement

On August 20, 2026, Toronto Centre published the podcast episode The Landscape of Financial Supervision and Security, featuring Tom Keatinge, Founding Director of the Centre for Finance and Security at RUSI, in conversation with former Basel Committee Secretary General Bill Coen. They discussed how financial supervisors should respond when foreign interference, sanctions, cyber threats and state activity move through the same institutions and infrastructure they already supervise.
Canada has been building an answer since 2023. OSFI now assesses whether federally regulated financial institutions can protect themselves against threats to their integrity and security, including foreign interference. It has also built a national security function that brings classified intelligence into supervisory work. What began as a legislative mandate is now part of how Canadian financial institutions are supervised.
A bank can be well capitalized and still face risk from foreign interference, state sponsored cyber activity, opaque ownership or compromised third parties. OSFI's integrity and security framework puts those threats inside its supervisory mandate.
In 2023, parliament expanded OSFI's mandate through Bill C 47. Federally regulated financial institutions became responsible for having policies and procedures to protect against threats to their integrity and security, including foreign interference. OSFI described the expanded mandate as a significant increase in the type of oversight it provides.
In 2024, OSFI finalized its Integrity and Security Guideline. Institutions were expected to assess risks involving foreign interference, undue influence, ownership, third parties, malicious activity and unauthorized access to their operations or assets.
In 2025, OSFI identified integrity and security as a major risk to Canada's financial system. Its work increasingly included state linked actors, cyber threats, geopolitical risk and intelligence sharing with federal security partners.
In 2026, The work continues as part of regular supervision. OSFI's 2026 to 2027 risk outlook continues to identify foreign interference, malicious cyber activity and threats to critical financial infrastructure. In September, OSFI appointed senior leadership with direct responsibility for integrity and national security.
National security has moved through legislation, supervisory guidance, intelligence capability, risk assessment and senior accountability. Banks should expect it to remain part of supervision, while fintechs may face many of the same expectations by extension through third party relationships with regulated financial institutions, including tighter due diligence, cyber, data, sanctions and incident reporting requirements.
Keatinge argues that traditional anti money laundering controls are better at finding known financial crime than activity backed by a hostile state. Money used to fund influence or interference may come from a legal source, move through regulated institutions and involve companies or people that appear legitimate. The problem may not be where the money came from. It may be who is directing the activity and why.
FATF has not said its framework is inadequate for political interference, but its own work shows how difficult state linked financial activity can be to detect. A June 2025 review found only 16% of assessed jurisdictions demonstrated high or substantial effectiveness in implementing targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation. The networks FATF describes often use front companies, hidden ownership, intermediaries, trade and virtual assets. FATF's proliferation financing review documents those methods.
FINTRAC's counter proliferation work covers sanctions evasion and threats to the security of Canada. Reporting entities are expected to look through ownership, control and corporate relationships when suspicious activity appears. A transaction can look ordinary while the people, companies or purpose behind it tell a different story.
Keatinge uses stablecoins to show how financial innovation can create economic and security risks at the same time. If households and businesses in a smaller economy transfer substantial savings from local bank deposits into US dollar stablecoins, local banks may lose part of the funding they use to make loans. At scale, that can become a financial stability and monetary sovereignty issue, especially when domestic savings and payments depend more heavily on assets and infrastructure controlled outside the country.
BIS research published in 2026 says stablecoins could make bank funding more expensive if people move money out of deposits. That could leave banks with less money to lend, including to small businesses. The IMF also warns that if money moves from local bank deposits into stablecoins backed by assets held abroad, less funding may remain in the domestic banking system. So far, however, the IMF says there is no clear evidence that this has caused widespread bank disintermediation.
Stablecoins also raise sanctions, cyber and financial crime concerns. FATF has identified virtual assets in proliferation financing and sanctions evasion, while state sponsored cyber actors have stolen digital assets to help fund government programs. Canada's stablecoin regulatory framework brings these risks into the wider debate over how digital money should be supervised.
Keatinge describes the financial system as a domain of geopolitical conflict. Regulators usually use different language, but sanctions, cyberattacks and financial infrastructure already play direct roles in relations between states. Governments can restrict access to financial transactions and services, state sponsored actors target financial institutions and payment networks, and financial infrastructure is treated as critical infrastructure.
In May 2026, G7 finance ministries, central banks, bank supervisors and market authorities ran a cross border exercise based on a large scale cyberattack affecting financial systems across G7 countries. They tested how authorities would respond, restore services, communicate during the crisis and coordinate across borders. The G7 exercise shows how a cyberattack on one part of the financial system can quickly affect institutions in other countries.
A serious attack on payments, banking access, market infrastructure or a major technology provider can disrupt services and weaken confidence at the same time. Firms building payment, identity, digital asset or financial infrastructure need to treat resilience as part of the product, not just an internal technology issue.
1. Foreign influence and a provincial referendum
In September 2026, Canada's Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner said the office was aware of concerns about foreign influence activities directed at the Alberta referendum. The Commissioner reminded participants that arrangements with foreign principals intended to influence a provincial referendum can require registration. The Commissioner's statement shows how political influence can intersect with payments, intermediaries and funding relationships.
2. Crowdfunding brought permanently into financial crime controls
During the 2022 Emergencies Act response, Canada temporarily extended anti money laundering and anti terrorist financing obligations to donation crowdfunding platforms and certain payment service providers. After the emergency ended, the government made separate regulatory changes that permanently brought donation crowdfunding platforms and certain payment processors, including businesses handling fiat or virtual currency transactions into Canada's AML regime. NCFA challenged the permanent rules, arguing that the government had not published enough evidence to justify their scope and that smaller platforms would carry a disproportionate compliance burden. The episode shows how a security event can lead to lasting regulatory change for an entire fintech sector.
3. Digital assets used to preserve access to global finance
In August 2026, the US Treasury sanctioned two digital asset exchanges and a network of front companies that it said Iran used to launder billions of dollars, maintain covert access to international financial systems and support sanctioned actors. The Treasury action shows how exchanges, wallets and corporate networks can become part of sanctions enforcement even when a traditional bank is not at the centre of the transaction.
4. Payments routed through intermediaries
FINTRAC requires transactions originating from or bound for Russia to be treated as high risk and calls for additional checks on identity, source of funds or virtual currency, transaction purpose and beneficial ownership. Its sanctions guidance also describes shell companies, intermediary jurisdictions, crypto exchanges and brokers being used to obscure sanctioned activity. FINTRAC's Russia guidance shows why screening the immediate sender or destination may not reveal the real exposure.
5. Cyber theft used to fund weapons programs
FINTRAC has documented North Korea's use of cyber theft, digital assets, front companies and financial intermediaries in activity connected with weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. FINTRAC's proliferation bulletin connects cyber security, wallet intelligence, beneficial ownership and sanctions controls to the same state backed financing problem.
For fintechs, the risk may be behind the payment in who owns the company, who benefits, where the money is routed or what the transaction is meant to achieve. A security event can also bring new rules to an entire sector with little time to prepare.
Banks and credit unions may have to look beyond capital, liquidity and operational risk to ownership, foreign influence, sanctions, cyber threats and insider risk. Smaller institutions could face higher compliance costs as national security becomes more closely tied to supervision.
For fintechs and payment firms, onboarding may need to go beyond identity checks and standard AML screening. State linked counterparties, unusual ownership structures, high risk jurisdictions and cyber exposure can all matter. Faster payments and digital assets also leave less time to spot and stop suspicious activity.
RegTech firms have a clear opportunity. The challenge is to combine transaction data with beneficial ownership, sanctions, corporate networks and cyber intelligence without overwhelming compliance teams with false positives. AI, programmable finance and financial crime increasingly meet inside the same monitoring systems.
Founders and investors should expect these issues to arise earlier. They can affect product design, bank partnerships, regulatory approvals and access to capital well before a company reaches bank scale.
National security is becoming part of everyday financial supervision. The difficult challenge is spotting harmful activity when the money and transaction both look legitimate. Banks and fintechs will need to understand not just where money comes from, but who is behind it, where it is going and what it is meant to achieve.
The National Crowdfunding & Fintech Association (NCFA Canada) is a financial innovation ecosystem that provides education, market intelligence, industry stewardship, networking and funding opportunities and services to thousands of community members and works closely with industry, government, partners and affiliates to create a vibrant and innovative fintech and funding industry in Canada. Decentralized and distributed, NCFA is engaged with global stakeholders and helps incubate projects and investment in fintech, alternative finance, crowdfunding, peer-to-peer finance, payments, digital assets and tokens, artificial intelligence, blockchain, cryptocurrency, regtech, and insurtech sectors. Join Canada's Fintech & Funding Community today FREE! Or become a contributing member and get perks. For more information, please visit: www.ncfacanada.org
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